Consolidating Democracy and Building the Nation:
Chiefs in South Africa
April 14-16, 2005 in Neuchâtel, Switzerland
By Patrick Harries, University of Basel
South Africa is a republic with several thousand chiefs and
headmen, and seventeen kings, paramount chiefs and queens.
Most are gathered in two provinces (KwaZulu-Natal and the
Eastern Cape) while the two richest provinces (Gauteng and
Western Cape) have no chiefs at all. There are very few female
chiefs and even fewer young men represented in their ranks.
How we reconcile the democratic traditions of a republican
state with the inherited role of the chief, as the leader
of his community, is at the heart of my talk today.
I. History:
Chiefs existed throughout what we know of South African history.
The Khoi pastoralists who met the first Dutch settlers in
the 1650s were led by chiefs. Even the acephalous San hunter-gatherers
who lived in small bands without conspicuous chiefs developed
their own systems of chiefly rule, particularly as their independence
was threatened. Over time the Dutch destroyed the Khoi chiefdoms
and incorporated their members into the labour force on settler
farms. Later, many of the descendents of these rural Khoi
made their way to mission farms where they constituted Christian
communities with their own leaders. Other descendents of the
Khoi made their way, under their chiefs, across the frontier
to form highly mobile, armed communities called Griquas, Oorlams
or Basters. A quarter century after the British seized the
Cape in 1806, the new colonial power recognized the authority
of some of these independent chiefs.
The British developed a high regard for the chiefs of the
Bantu-speaking agriculturalists against whom they fought on
the eastern Frontier. In the early years of British rule at
the Cape, as imperial armies pushed African peoples back from
the Fish river, the British incorporated the newly colonized
areas, and their occupants, into the Cape Colony. These areas
were initially ruled by the Governor in Cape Town with the
aid of nominated assistants drawn from the settler establishment.
But in 1853 the Cape was given a new constitution based on
notions of liberal democracy imported from Britain. This introduced
a colour-blind franchise open to all males who earned £50
a year or who owned property worth £25. Voters were
not required to be literate. Men who met the low franchise
qualification were eligible for election to the House of Assembly;
but a relatively high property qualification (£2,000
fixed or £4,000 unfixed property), restricted entrance
to the Upper House, or Legislative Council. The first representative
government was elected in 1854 but, within twenty years, this
democratic system came under pressure as the Cape started
to annex large areas of land, and its African occupants, to
the east of the Kei river. Rather than provide these new citizens
with the franchise, the Cape politicians developed a form
of Indirect Rule through which the Transkeian chiefs continued
to govern their own people – although with the aid of
government magistrates. At the beginning of the twentieth
century a parliament for chiefs, or Bunga, was erected in
the Transkeian capital of Umtata. Chiefs sat alongside magistrates
in the Bunga where they representated their communities and,
in this building, discussed and voted on issues of interest
to their communities.
In the colony of Natal, established by the British in 1843,
a different form of Indirect Rule emerged. In this area, a
form of segregation was initiated at the onset of British
rule as the land was divided between European settlers and
African chiefs who ruled in areas “reserved” for
African occupation, as well as on “Crown land”
(that still had to be sold) or on large mission farms or “reserves”.
This “Shepstonian system” (named after its inventor)
acted as a model of Indirect Rule for other parts of the British
empire, especially at the Cape. It turned the chief into a
paid government official who maintained law and order and
who collected taxes for the government. Some historians argue
that the roots of segregation are to be found in the Shepstonian
system as, although the chiefs continued to exercise a limited
authority over their people, almost all Africans were prohibited
from participating in the electoral politics of the colony.
In the interior, settlers escaping from British rule at the
Cape formed two, independent republics during the late 1830s-40s.
These descendents of the early Dutch settlers initially gathered
in the interior in their own political communities under their
own chiefs. In the early 1850s these communities coalesced
to form the Orange Free State and the South African Republic
that were duly recognized by the British as independent territories.
Independent chiefs ruled many areas claimed by these impoverished
republics well into the 1880s. The discovery of gold transformed
the Transvaal and the last of the independent chiefs was finally
conquered in 1898 and he, like the chiefs to the south, was
incorporated into a rural “location” or reserve.
The chiefs in these republics could advise the local representatives
of the “Native Affairs” department – but
only on an informal basis. Africans in these “trekker”
republics had no political representation.
The Union of South Africa, established in 1910, brought together
the Cape, Natal, Transvaal and Orange Free State but left
“the native question” unresolved. Africans who
qualified to vote in the Cape continued to do so while those
in the Transvaal and OFS were excluded from electoral politics
– as were almost all African in Natal. Even in the Cape,
the qualifications for the franchise were constantly raised
in such a way as to exclude Africans; and the Bunga provided
the main outlet for African political ambitions. During the
1920s, segregation provided the Union with a comprehensive
answer to the “native question”. This caused Africans
in the Cape to be removed from the common voters’ role
in 1936. Africans throughout South Africa were then allowed
to vote for white members of parliament who would represent
their interests. In this way, blacks were excluded from sitting
in the national parliament; and their voting power was effectively
segregated to a handful of white parliamentary representatives.
In the meantime, segregation reinforced the role of the chiefs
who were regarded by most white politicians to be the “real”
representatives of the African people. As early as 1913, the
Natives’ Land Act prohibited whites from buying land
in those areas of South Africa reserved for African occupation.
While Africans were also prohibited, under the law, from buying
land in “white” areas, the extent of the reserves
(i.e. those areas ruled by chiefs) was increased by the Act.
In the 1920s various laws were passed in an attempt to stop
the disintegration of the chiefs’ powers; for as South
Africa became an industrial country, large numbers of men
(and increasingly women) had started to escape the control
of the chiefs. The new laws recognized the role of the chiefs
as civil servants, provided them with a formal income, and
entrenched tribal law and custom. Under this legislation,
the government eventually recognized various “Paramount”
chiefs – most notably the Zulu chief (whose ancestors
had never governed the Zulu-speaking people living south of
the Tugela river in the British colony of Natal).
Under the Apartheid system established in 1948, segregationist
politicians saw the chiefs and the reserves as a solution
to a “native question” that had reemerged as “detribalized”
Africans increasingly demanded direct representation in the
electoral politics of the nation. In the 1950s the various
reserves were enlarged and incorporated into “Territorial
Authorities” that came to be known as ethnic “homelands”
or “Bantustans”. In these areas chiefs ruled “Tribal
Authorities” and were nominated to fill most of the
seats in the legislative assemblies. In the Transkei this
meant that the Bunga became the parliament of the Transkeian
homeland that, in 1963, became an “independent”
state. In reality, most homelands remained almost entirely
dependent for their finances on the central government in
Pretoria (which was dependent on the whites-only parliament
in Cape Town). However in at least one homeland, the Tswana
state of “Bophuthatswana”, the local government
was able to acquire sufficient revenue (in this case from
platinum mining) to establish an independent economic infrastructure.
In KwaZulu, chief Mangosotho Buthelezi originally came to
power with the support of the exiled African National Congress.
But by the late 1970s he had developed a mass-based political
following in KwaZulu that threatened the dominance of the
ANC in the area. Elsewhere, two homelands (besides the Transkei
and Bophuthatswana) took independence and, in the 1980s, were
seized by military dictators (Venda and Ciskei).
Chiefs were not simple collaborators in the running of the
homelands. In September 1987 a group of 38 chiefs met to form
a Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa that operated
independently of Inkatha. Contralesa served the interests
of chiefs but, unlike Inkatha, called for the dismantling
of the Bantustan system. However in most parts of South Africa
chiefs supported apartheid structures and prevented the ANC
from infiltrating into their territory. In the KwaZulu-Natal
area the competition between the ANC and the Inkatha Freedom
Party of chief Buthelezi led to open fighting in the mid-1980s.
When the transfer of power was initiated in South Africa in
1990, this fighting spread to other parts of the country and,
as the country approached an electoral solution to its problems,
a low-intensity civil war broke out. In the end, the homeland
leaders constituted the last defenders of the apartheid system
(on which they were dependent for their political survival).
While some homelands openly supported the ANC in the early
1990s (Transkei and Venda), others prepared to do battle.
When the ANC tried to seize control of the independent Ciskei
homeland in 1992, the local military dictator gave orders
to fire on demonstrators – of whom over thirty were
killed. In similar circumstances in Bophuthatswana, chief
Mongope called on armed right-wing opponents of majority rule
for support. This brought South Africa close to the edge of
full-scale civil war in early 1994. Even when Bophuthatswana
eventually fell to the ANC, chief Buthelezi refused to capitulate
and, until the last moment, and in the midst of a rising civil
war, refused to collaborate in the transfer of power (that
eventually resulted in the democratic elections held in April
1994).
II. The New South Africa:
The ANC emerged from the elections in 1994 with the support
of over sixty per cent of the electorate. But twenty per cent
of the electorate voted for he National Party (that had governed
the country since 1948) and a further ten per cent, almost
entirely in rural KwaZulu-Natal, supported chief Buthelezi’s
IFP. The country remained divided between those who saw the
authority of the chiefs as a form of “decentralized
despotism” (Mahmood Mamdani), mainly the trade unionists
and youth who had brought about the transfer of power, and
those who saw the chiefdom as a structure on which to build
a form of “authentic African democracy”. Although
chieftaincies excluded almost all women and young men, and
depended on inherited power, it was argued that they could
be restructured in such a way as to become more representative
of the population at large. Chiefs had been included in the
final stages of the negotiated transfer of power, when they
were included in the multi-party conference (the Convention
for a Democratic South Africa or Codesa) that resulted in
the democratic elections of April 1994. Many chiefs were concerned
to extend this political role under ANC rule.
Chapter twelve of the new constitution of South Africa, drawn
up in 1996, recognized the position of chiefs in a democratic
South Africa. At the same time, it held out the possible creation
of (local) houses of traditional leaders in which chiefs could
gather as a lobby group in support of their, and more broadly
local, interests. The new constitution also held out the possible
creation of a Council or House of traditional leaders that
would serve the same function at a national level. The followers
of the governing ANC had fought the chiefs, sometimes physically,
in the decade leading up to 1994; and most remained intrinsically
opposed to the power of the chiefs. In the new rural and urban
municipalities created to replace apartheid structures at
the local level, chiefs were relegated to an advisory position
and were subordinated to local elected councils. Many chiefs
opposed this development as the new municipalities cut into,
and divided, their old Tribal Authorities. Elected councils
thus replaced chiefs as centres of local power and threatened
to undermine forms of local, provincial and national remuneration
received by chiefs. However, in the national elections of
1994 and 1999 it became clear to the ANC that the chiefs exercised
an important influence over their followers during elections.
In some rural constituencies, such as the Northern (Limpopo)
province, chiefs contributed to an overwhelming ANC victory
of close to 98%. The chiefs’ opposition caused local
elections to be postponed three times. In 2000, chiefs again
threatened to organize a boycott of local elections as these
proposed to replace them everywhere with elected councils
(to which they would serve as advisory officers).
In 2003 the South African parliament attempted to settle
some of these issues when it passed a Traditional Leadership
and Governance Framework Bill. This envisaged the establishment
of “traditional councils” when the provincial
premier recognized the legitimacy of “traditional communities”
at the local level. These bodies would use ‘custom and
tradition’ to maintain order, and provide spiritual
guidance, in local communities. In areas with elected local
councils, these ‘traditional councils’ would serve
in an advisory capacity. Where traditional councils have been
established, they are dominated by chiefs but will, theoretically,
require a female representation of 30-40 per cent. The traditional
councils are expected to both challenge and accept custom
for, although chiefs are viewed as “traditional rulers”,
they are also encouraged to promote gender equality and discourage
established forms of discrimination.
Under the legislation, Provincial Houses of Traditional Leaders
have been (or will be) established in six of the nine provinces
of South Africa. If the Griqua “chiefs” are recognized
as traditional leaders, an HTL will be established in another
province (the Northern Cape). Each HTL supplies the 20-member
National Council of Chiefs, established in Pretoria in 1997,
with a fixed number of representatives. In KwaZulu-Natal,
the most populous province, 26 regional authorities send 84
chiefs to a House of Traditional Leaders, established in 1996,
in Ulundi. This body, in turn, sends three representatives
to the National Council of Traditional leaders (established
in 1997) in Pretoria. During the apartheid period, Inkatha
drew on the support of the Zulu king, Goodwill Zwelithini,
as the leader of the Zulu chiefs and people. On the eve of
the 1994 elections he was provided with the revenues drawn
from a large tract of government land that allowed him to
break away from the control of Inkatha.
The major function of the traditional councils is to advise
government, at the local and national levels, on local “custom
and tradition”. They will also engage in development
work, particularly in the struggle against HIV/AIDS; they
will register voters for local and national elections; and
they will allocate land to community members. Under the Communal
land Tenure Bill of 2004, government aims to transfer the
control of ‘communal lands’ from the chiefs to
‘communities’ through Traditional Councils and
Land Allocation Committees that will oversee the distribution
of land in such a way as, for the first time, to provide security
of tenure for those living on land, including women. But the
act will also entrench the power of the chiefs who will be
expected to “administer” the land.
The role of the chiefs in a future South Africa remains a
major point of contention. Chief Mangosotho Buthelezi has
emerged as the loudest critic of the recent legislation that,
he fears, will subordinate the Zulu king to the elected (ANC)
provincial leader, the (provincial) Minister of Traditional
Affairs and the (national) Minister of Provincial and Local
government. He is particularly worried that it will make chiefs
little more than instruments of municipal government; and
that the removal of the chiefs from their position of power
and respect will undermine the ritual and substance of a separate
Zulu identity and nation. Negotiations over the role of the
chiefs in the consolidation of democracy and nation-building
will, undoubtedly, remain an important issue in South African
politics.
BIBLIOGRAPHY:
Comaroff, John L.; “Chiefship in a South African Homeland”
Journal of Southern African Studies 1, 1, 1974
Mulaudzi, Maanda: “Chieftainship and its relationship
to democracy (past and present) in Democracy X: Marking the
Present: Re-presenting the Past (Pretoria, 2004), eds., A.W.
Oliphant, et. al.
Maloka, Tshidiso: “Populism and the Politics of Chieftaincy
and Nation-Building in the New South Africa” Journal
of Contemporary African Studies 14, 2, 1996.
McIntosh, Alistair: “Rethinking chieftaincy and the
future of rural local government” Transformation 13,
1990
Skweyiya, Zola, “Chieftaincy, the ethnic question and
the democratization process in South Africa” (unpublished
paper, Community Law centre, University of the Western cape,
1993)
Williams, J.M.: “Leading from Behind: democratic consolidation
and the chieftaincy in South Africa” Journal of Modern
African Studies 42, 1, 2004
