Tribal Conferences and Conflict Resolution Experiences
Under British and Sudanese Rule
By Khalid Ali El Amin - Neuchâtel, April 16, 2005
Introduction
The British colonial rule in Sudan sometimes exhibits aspects
of governance, which despite differences in time and context,
could provide useful lessons for present day politicians and
administrators. One area of policy experience from which lessons
could be drawn is the way in which modern government deals
and interacts with communities and societies that are traditional
in structure and culture. Of particular relevance to modern
government and traditional structures is the adoption of Tribal
Conferences based on the indigenous mediation mechanism known
as Agaweed. The British also innovated Annual Tribal Conferences
based on local structures and culture to prevent and resolve
conflict and maintain peace among tribes. Since their introduction
by the British (both Tirbal Conferences and Annual Tribal
Conferences in the 1920s and to the present day, they have
served as a means of achieving in Sudan’s countryside
with different degrees of success during colonial and post
colonial periods.
Tribal Conferences, which are based on the Sudanese mediation
tradition of Agaweed, will be examined first under British
rule and early Sudanese governments. The second phase, since
the 1970s, in which Tribal Conferences have been changed significantly
(into Inter-Tribal Reconciliation Conferences) will be examined
next. The Third Part deals with Annual Tribal Conferences,
a British innovation also based on tradition, and discuss
their role in conflict early warning, prevention, management
and resolution, under British rule. Annual Tribal Conferences
under Sudanese governments since the 1970s will be sketched
in the fourth part. The outline of the paper winds up with
some conclusions.
Tribal Conferences under British Rule And Early Sudanese
Governments
To resolve conflicts between tribes the British adopted the
indigenous Agaweed form of conflict resolution mechanism,
with some slight modifications to turn it into Tribal Conferences.
What the British modified is that mediators in inter-tribal
conflicts are the leaders or Nazirs of other neighbouring
tribes not party to the dispute (instead of men of wisdom
from within the community) in the presence of some British
officials .
Agaweed in Arabic means mediators and in this context it
implies one form of conflict resolution adopted in many parts
of the Sudan to restore peace between conflicting parties.
Socially the party that does not accept the Agaweed verdict
is not looked upon favourably by the local community. After
understanding the two parties positions, they discuss among
themselves work out strategy of how to approach the two parties.
They divide themselves into two groups and negotiate with
each party separately. Through patience and step by step negotiations
all parties reach a consensus and reconciliation. In the final
meeting the Agaweed announce their decisions as a resolution
to the conflict. According to tradition both parties abide
by the agreement. In most cases the agreement normally includes
compensation for damages where one party, as a result of the
dispute, suffers losses. The Agaweed proved to be a very effective
mediation mechanism for resolving conflicts between groups
(sub-tribal units of clan, lineage and extended family). Cultural
traditions of accepting the Agaweed final verdict help the
Agaweed mediation efforts. The Agaweed mechanism functions
bottom-up and members of the Agaweed are drawn from amongst
community members. They understand community culture, traditions,
customs and values and apply it well to conflict resolution.
In many cases the Agaweed intervention results in forgiveness
and reconciliation.
During the British rule the Tribal Conference, when convened
to resolve a tribal conflict, was a small group of powerful
community leaders (tribal leaders) with very strong grassroots
relationship. During the negotiations the two leaders representing
the two tribes party to the dispute return to their tribesmen
(normally tribal leaders of lower rank) who would be outside
the conference hall for consultation and negotiations. Sub-tribal
leaders normally consult with their rank and file tribal folks.
Through several rounds of negotiations, side talks and consultations
between tribal leaders and their tribesmen the final agreement
reached is a result of consent of both parties. It is an agreement
endorsed by the grassroots who are aware of its details through
communication between their middle rank tribal leaders and
their representative (the Nazir) at the conference table.
The British preserved the Agaweed mechanism and the way it
functions and did not intervene in the negotiations or the
deliberations of representatives at the tribal conferences
In addition, tribal leaders who attended these conferences
as Agaweed did have full powers and were not pressurised to
reach solutions. Discussion and deliberations were allowed
to proceed freely and agreements were reached by consensus
according to tradition . Although conformity and commitment
to implement the agreement is imposed and necessitated by
tradition, the presence of the colonial government officials
is to guarantee that an agreement is implemented.
Because grassroots are involved and consulted during the
negotiations together with the respect tribal leaders’
commanded, decisions are respected and implemented. This is
one important reason why these Tribal Conferences derived
from the Agaweed were a remarkable success in solving many
inter-tribal conflicts during British rule and early post
independence period.
Tribal Conferences Post 1970 (Inter-Tribal Reconciliation
Conferences)
This Agaweed form of conflict resolution, which was developed
by the British into tribal conferences, have recently been
made into an ineffective a semi-formal ad hoc organisation
called Inter-tribal Reconciliation Conferences . As will be
seen below tribal conferences, which have functioned so well
in the past, have recently repeatedly failed to resolve many
serious tribal conflicts that have devastated Sudan during
the last few decades; particularly in Darfur.
The structure of Tribal Conferences has been modified to
incorporate more tribal leaders, notables, representatives
of relevant government bodies and above all central government
top officials sometimes including the vice-president, a number
of ministers, presidential aides and consultants.
A delegation representing each of the two tribes party to
the conflict are also invited. Some specialised committees
are formed to collect information, study specific relevant
technical issues and provide recommendations. Then one representative
from each delegation of the two tribes party to conflict addresses
the conference, reading from a prepared text, citing the case
of his tribe.
An Inter-Tribal Reconciliation Conference is normally convened
when a serious tribal conflict erupts. When convened to devise
a resolution to a conflict, it considers and discusses different
issues of relevance to the conflict at hand. The issues differ
from one conference to another according to the relevance
of problems and issues involved in the settlement of each
tribal conflict a conference is called upon to deal with.
Land, access to water and water yards, corridors for pastoralist
issues, possession of firearms as well as tribal political
offices, are among the common issues recently figured prominently
in tribal reconciliation conferences.
As the issues involved in inter-tribal conflicts are very
complex, the number of those convening is too large (300)
and the conference takes four to five days, not all members
of the conference do take part in the deliberations. In addition
the presence of top government officials exerts direct and
indirect pressure on the delegates of the conflicting tribes.
The conference ends up with the announcement of the final
decisions and recommendations , which are reached without
discussing the details.
The duration and the way Tribal conference function does
not allow the representatives of the conflicting tribes to
consult and negotiate with the grassroots. The representatives
of the two tribes in conflict do not negotiate the agreement
but they have to accept the Agaweed decisions in accordance
with the deputation that they have already signed at the start
of the conference. Although the Agaweed consult with the two
parties, they mostly endorse the recommendations of specialised
committees, with some slight modifications. These are finally
adopted as the conference decisions and recommendations.
The conference final decisions and recommendations might
not be convincing to the representatives of the two tribes
in conflict but they are still accepted in response to government
overt and covert pressure. The mere presence of this parade
of top government officials is sufficient to press the representatives
of both tribes not to express their views, particularly under
oppressive governments, which could be considered dissent.
Acceptance of decisions is to conform with their deputation
to the Agaweed and also a response to the government leverage.
The lack of grassroots participation is one major contributory
factor to the failure of Tribal Reconciliation Conferences.
Grassroots neither understand the agreement nor in most cases
agree to it. In the hurry to reach an agreement, implicitly
drawn on government terms, much grassroots concerns are left
out and it is what is left out that ignites the conflict once
again. Subsequently, the two parties see the conference from
the viewpoint of loss and gains rather than compromise and
reconciliation. The party that feels or perceives itself to
lose would find any excuse as an opportunity to let itself
free of the decisions.
The inflation of the conference to include a large number
of delegates does not allow discussion of details that matter
most to the grassroots. The time is normally too short for
members of the two disputing parties to express and voice
grassroots’ views and concerns; in seeing the forest
the sight of the trees is lost and so is grassroots’
consent.
Although heavy central government involvement in tribal reconciliation
conferences partly shows concern over the security threat
tribal conflicts pose, yet it has played a negative rather
than a positive role in these conferences and thus limited
their effectiveness. Tribal Reconciliation Conferences have
as a consequence been turned from an adapted form of an indigenous
conflict resolution mechanism that functions bottom-up into
a semi-formal governmental ad hoc organisation that functions
top-down. Government leverage substituted consultation, negotiation,
traditional arbitration and grassroots active participation
and consent. Although well-elaborated agreements signed by
all parties decorated with the stamp and signatures of top
government officials are produced and announced in practice
that did not worth more than the paper on which these agreements
are type-written. Soon after the conferences disbanded, tribal
conflicts erupt once again as a testimony to the failure of
a gathering which looks more of a political parade than a
true Tribal Reconciliation Conference.
Annual Tribal Conferences as CPMR Mechanisms under
British Rule and Early Sudanese Governments
Annual Tribal Conferences were an innovation initiated by
the British and continued to function till the Native Administration
started to decline by the 1960s. Annual Tribal Conferences
were gatherings of tribal leaders for each province held annually
in different parts of the Sudan. In every province an annual
conference attended by local tribal leaders of different ranks,
which included some from different tribes, was convened annually
in the past. Leaders used to discuss conflict and friction
between tribes for the previous year resolve current problems,
which could lead to conflict. But most importantly tribal
leaders at the conference exchange information on issues of
common concern likely to create tribal friction in the following
year . Precautionary measures are taken to avoid and prevent
inter and intra-tribal interaction that could lead to the
eruption of such conflicts. Plans are also drawn to manage
and resolve such conflicts when they occur.
The most important of these annual tribal conferences held
by local administrators and tribal leaders was Safaha’s
which lies on the two banks of Bahel Arab river forming a
bridge between the Dinka in the South and Reziegat tribe in
the North. Safaha is thus a meeting place between North and
South, between Arab tribes of the North and the Dinka tribes
of the South. Administrators and local tribal Dinka and Arab
leaders convene at Safaha annually to conduct discussion and
consultation on issues of common concern. As any other annual
tribal conference, issues and problems that might disrupt
relations between the two sides are discussed. Issues and
problems for the previous year reviewed, current problems
discussed and resolved. During the conference period people
from both sides gather in Safaha in great numbers, both Dinka
and Arab to sing and dance while leaders were in continuous
session.
Annual Tribal Conferences (The Tribal System Conference)
1995
Since the 1970s Safaha and other annual tribal conferences
ceased to function after the dissolution of the Native Administration
and the decline of tribal leaders’ political position.
The government has initiated the Tribal System Conference
as a substitute in 1995. The Tribal System Conference, which
is a gathering of all Sudanese tribal leaders, is the former
Annual Tribal Conference reconstituted and renamed. The aims
of the conference as declared by the government include getting
the leaders of different Sudanese tribes to come together,
know each other and exchange experiences. Experts on different
relevant issues address the conference and the presentation
of cultural activities of different tribes including, folklore
songs, dances and exhibitions of handicrafts . The Tribal
System Conference was a failure and held only once; in 1995.
Tribal leaders, participants in the Conference did not discuss
particular issues or come up with specific decisions or recommendations
and this was because of the nature of the conference itself;
its objectives, composition and the dominance of the government.
Unlike the former Annual Tribal Conference no tangible results
were expected from it. The composition was also different
from the former Annual Tribal Conference that was devised
by the British. Instead of tribal leaders in a particular
province coming together to discuss and resolve specific problems
related to that locality as was the case in the Annual Tribal
conferences, The Tribal System Conference (1995) was a gathering
of tribal leaders from all over the Sudan. This together with
heavy government involvement, the gathering was turned into
a semi-governmental ad hoc body losing its former independence.
Government intervention has been motivated by concerns to
achieve political ends rather maintain inter-tribal peace.
All these factors inhibited the gathering from exercising
former conflict early warning, prevention, management and
resolution functions.
Past experience has shown that Annual Tribal Conferences
held in different provinces of the Sudan were effective conflict
early warning, prevention, management and resolution mechanisms
during British rule and early post independence period. The
infrequent occurrence of tribal conflicts, their small-scale
and the relatively insignificant consequences of past tribal
conflicts could partly be regarded as an evidence of the success
of Annual Tribal Conferences during British rule. When it
has recently been reconstituted as the Tribal System Conference,
the mechanism has failed to function as an effective conflict
prevention, management and resolution mechanism.
Some of the main reasons for
the failure of annual tribal leaders’ gathering are
the following:
The change in the position of tribal leaders and the gradual
erosion of their power base within their communities;
The change in the structure and composition of annual tribal
conference from being composed of tribal leaders of localities
(provinces) to a gathering that includes all tribal leaders
of the Sudan.
The heavy politicisation of the conference and intensive
government involvement in the preparation for it and the conduct
of its affairs have all reoriented the tribal gathering from
its original local specific problems to those of government
policy and strategy;
The reformulation of these annual tribal gathering, which
used in the past to deal with specific issues of tribal conflict
and peace, into a means of indoctrination and co-optation
of local leadership.
Some Conclusions
The adoption of Agaweed in the form of Tribal Conferences
not only manifests a practical approach to effective governance
by incorporating indigenous social and political structures
into modern government but also the wisdom of appreciating
indigenous cultural values, social norms and mechanisms that
have maintained stability without central government intervention
for centuries.
The experience also shows traditional culture and structures
have the capacity to maintain, administer, resolve conflict
and sustain peace amongst both within and between communities.
The success of tribal conferences could mainly be attributed
to minimal government intervention, the power tribal leaders
enjoyed, grassroots involvement and participation, lean effective
structure and the resolution of conflicts on the basis of
consent and reconciliation.
Its successor “Inter-Tribal Reconciliation conferences”
have involved heavy government intervention, large inappropriate
membership, and does not take enough time to resolve conflicts.
The lack of participation of grassroots and the ever present
government pressure, since the 1970s, mere announcements that
do little to quell grievance and tension at the grassroots
level. Despite numerous inter-tribal reconciliation conferences,
sustainable inter-tribal peace has thus become unattainable.
Similar conclusion could be drawn from the experience of
Annual Tribal Conferences during British rule and post independence
governments. But the most important
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-List of losses and damages
-members of the agaweed group
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Inter-Tribal Masaliet-Arab Tribes Reconciliation Conference,
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Personal Interviews
1. Fuad Eid, Former Senior Local Government Officer, Former
Central Agency for tribal Affairs, well-experienced in Conflict
Resolution and Conflict Management and the one of the main
sources on Darfur, January 27, April 3rd, April 22nd , May
8th , 2001.
2. Abdel Gadir Munim Mansour, Nazir of Hamar Tribe, Kordofan,
April 12, 2001.
3. El Khier Abdel Rahim, senior Local government Officer,
West Darfur, April 21, 2001.
4. Mahmoud Adam Daoud, Nyala University Staff member, Born
and Living in West Darfur, May 2nd,2001. Also collected some
additional data.
5. Ahmed Abdel Gadir Arbab, Former Governor of Darfur, April
23, 2001.
6. Idris Ibrahim Idris, Member of West Darfur Legislatve
Council, April 9, 2001.
7. Aman Haroun, Senior Local Government Officer, North Darfur,
March 20, 2001.
