The Role of Traditional and Modern Practices
in State Construction in South Sudan
Paper Presented at:
“Modern
Government and Traditional Structures: An open consultation
on present challenges in the South Sudan,”
April 14-16, 2005, Hotel
“Beau Lac”, Neuchatel, Switzerland
By Leenco Lata
The Nature and Danger of Fundamentalisms
We, the peoples of the Horn of Africa, have experienced first
hand the tragic consequences of conflicts resulting from clashes
between opposing fundamentalisms. Fundamentalism arises when
choices confronting society are presumed to be between two
irreconcilable options. The implication of this presumption
is as self-evident as it is catastrophic. The disputes concerning
the conflicting binary choices routinely motivate the adoption
of another presumption with devastating implications: imposing
of one of these choices requires subordinating those opposed
to it or even their total eradication.
Religious fundamentalism lends itself best to this neat division
between its “saved” supporters and its “damned”
opponents for the simple reason that it draws on the premise
that there is only one truth or one true faith. We are all
painfully acquainted with the devastating consequences of
this mindset and hence I will not waste your time by going
over it. Our pre-occupation with only the religious variety
of fundamentalism worries me, however, for it may allow other
types to escape our attention. Drawing your attention to one
particular form of fundamentalism that is rarely recognized
is the aim of my presentation.
My topic thus is another manifestation of fundamentalism
in the form of modernization. Modernizing fundamentalism started
enjoying the upper in Africa starting in the 1900s due to
one specific reason. Educated elements from then on were instructed
to believe that African traditional institutions and practices
“are, in their character, darkness and depravity, and
in their effects, only evil and evil continually” (Davidson
1992: 43). This form of indoctrination remained in force in
the period leading up to independence when “an ever-widening
conflict of sympathy and purpose [developed] between the old
traditionalists, standing for the resurrection of precolonial
powers and prerogatives, and new nationalists for whom the
old powers and prerogatives had no more value, but were obstructions
to modernizing progress” (Davidson 1992: 73). The victory
of the modernizing fundamentalists at the time of independence
led to the ironic expectation that “Africa would be
free: except, of course, in terms of political and literate
culture, Africa would cease to be Africa” (Davidson
1992: 38). Behind this irony lurked the modernizing elite’s
tacit or explicit aspiration to transform African peoples
into English, French, or Portuguese speaking nations.
The modernizing fundamentalists thus simply presumed that
forging culturally homogeneous modern African nations would
succeed only by de-Africanizing traditional society. We, the
peoples of the Horn of Africa, share with other peoples of
our continent the predicament of being subjected to the modernizing
fundamentalists’ de-Africanization agenda. However,
our experience is unique in one particular respect. In our
case, dominant groups claiming supremacy on the basis of their
racial, religious, and nationality attributes led the de-Africanization
process and implemented it in a peculiar fashion. They exempted
themselves from de-Africanization due to their presumed non-African
origins but employed it as a rationale for erasing the identities
of the other more authentic African peoples under their domination.
This had the implication of enabling the dominant groups’
modernizing fundamentalism to operate side by side with its
manifestations in the form of racial, religious, and national
superiority. Consequently, they operate under the conviction
that the traditional institutions and practices of these subordinate
peoples have no positive role in solving social and political
problems. However, are there instances in which our peoples’
traditional approaches to problem solving have proven very
effective?
I could cite many examples of such instances, but I will
mention only one. I belong to the Oromo nation whose homeland
stretches from close to the Sudan border to the Ogaden and
from north of the Ethiopian capital to the Kenyan border.
The Borana branch of the Oromos inhabits an area straddling
the Kenya-Ethiopia boundary and ekes out a very meagre existence
as pastoralists. The Borana and their neighbouring pastoralist
groups started experiencing unusually severe periods of drought
from mid-1980s onwards. Repeated drought reduced available
pasture and water only to what is found in Borana homeland,
as the result of which the Borana found themselves in conflict
with many of their neighbours. Two such groups decided to
send a delegation to meet with Borana elders in 1993 to find
a more peaceful way out. After these early contacts made some
progress, Borana elders suggested the convening of the representatives
of all other stakeholders. This culminated in assembling representatives
of 14 pastoralist groups, at which an arrangement acceptable
to all of them was worked out (Suliman 1999: 288-90). The
wisdom of Borana elders is simple but very important: the
desperation and insecurity of one’s neighbours could
endanger one’s security. I cite this example in order
to motivate you to identify and tap into the effectiveness
of your peoples’ traditional approaches to problem solving.
Let me mention one very important presumption that stands
in the way of identifying such positive aspects of our peoples’
traditions. This is the presumption that African traditional
political entities were either despotic or chaotic. Democracy
in particular is considered alien to Africans who thus need
coaching by Westerners or Western educated individuals. I
am of the conviction, however, that democratic practices are
widespread throughout traditional Africa. For example, the
Oromo people used to practice a sophisticated democratic system
in which they elect their leaders every eight years until
they were conquered by northern Ethiopians at the end of the
nineteenth century. And it is the survival of this legacy
among the Borana that allowed them to arrive at the just arrangement
mentioned earlier. The system survived best among the Borana
because as pastoralists they were largely ignored by the conquerors.
The manner by which Borana deliberations commence and progress
contrasts with the winner-take-all approach so closely associated
with modern democratic practices. Borana deliberations begin
with the presiding officer instructing participants to avoid
argumentative and confrontational speech. He advises them:
“Do not look for the worst in what others have said
in order to undermine their position and win an argument;
look for the best they have to offer, so as to find a common
ground” (Legesse 2000: 214). Finding a common ground
in order to achieve peace is thus the ultimate purpose and
not the winning of the debate. I am mentioning this African
approach to the conduct and end result of debates in order
to encourage you to take a fresh look at your own peoples’
traditional practices so as to identify their constructive
aspects.
We can identify and employ the positive aspects of our peoples’
traditional institutions and practices in order to structure
and anchor our common states only under one condition. We
should give up the agenda of cultural and linguistic homogenization.
Only then can our common state institutions recognize and
protect the prevailing cultural diversity of our peoples.
The recognition of diversity is now actually a rising trend
since it is increasingly acknowledged that the “legitimacy
of the state and its related social, cultural and political
institutions” can be guaranteed only if “the core
features of citizens’ identity are both recognised by
the state [and also made] recognizable in the state”
(O’Leary 1999: 92). The state anchors itself in the
diverse peoples inhabiting its territory and thus becomes
more stable if the various peoples see themselves reflected
in the image of the state.
For the past so many decades we have exerted our energy towards
moulding, hammering, and battering traditional African societies
with the aim of fitting them into a preconceived state form.
I believe our failed experiences should encourage us to consider
the alternative; the alternative of constructing the state
around existing social groups and in consultation with them.
To be more specific the House of Nationalities could serves
as the venue for such a consultation.
Tribalism and Nationalism
While we are looking at this issue of allowing diversity
to be incorporated in the state and its portrayal, let me
bring up one practice that is widespread in Africa. As you
all know, African traditional societies are commonly called
tribes and harnessing their solidarity is routinely referred
to as practicing tribalism. Words and deeds have normally
been at loggerheads in the behaviour of educated Africans
where they concern tribalism. We, educated Africans, are as
vociferous in denouncing tribalism as we are hypocritical
in practising it when it serves our purposes. A Somali scholar
puts this mismatch between words and deeds as follows: “it
is hard to find a Somali politician who would feel free enough
to declare openly and without qualms that his loyalty is,
first and foremost, to his clan; on the other hand it is equally
hard to find one who would place the interests of the nation
above those of the clan, or who would act politically in a
way independent of clan affiliation.” None of us would
be averse to benefiting from tribalism although we are very
vocal in denouncing it. Leaders in particular have often driven
the “tribalism” of their opposition underground
while practising their own variety without shame or reservation.
This is one of the factors that put Somalia on the course
that resulted in the total disintegration of both society
and the state. What I am saying is this: we should not drive
underground the inevitable tapping into traditional solidarity
but bring it into the open, institutionalize it and channel
it in a positive direction.
Modernizing fundamentalists have hypocritically targeted for
eradication the traditions of other societies while openly
working to celebrate and preserve their own in the Horn of
Africa. They have used the agenda of homogenization as the
justification for their aspiration to construct culturally
and linguistically homogeneous African nations on the graves
of entities called tribes. The underlying premise hence is
the conviction that African traditional structures and practices
are irreconcilable with modern ones. This is what I now completely
disagree with for it reflects an assumption that these traditional
structures and practices do not deserve recognition as being
part of humanity’s experience.
My firm stand is that both the traditional and modern state
practices and institutions have to work in concert. Our very
survival in fact depends on achieving this balance in our
willingness to respect both tradition and modernity. We cannot
expect to survive by cutting ourselves off from modern structures
and practices operating at the global stage. Similarly we
cannot expect to thrive by totally alienating ourselves from
practices and structures handed down to us by our ancestors.
What is the consequence of the reconciliation between the
traditional and modern in conceptualizing our new state structures
and practices?
This balancing of the modern and traditional has two interdependent
positive consequences, the way I see it. It enables the states
to simultaneously connect with the state system at the global
sphere and to also extend their roots into the very soil on
which they stand. I believe African states cannot operate
with confidence and legitimacy at the global stage if they
are not rooted in grassroots communities. And they cannot
sufficiently serve the interests of these grassroots communities
unless they connect and interact with the modern global forces.
This is the general image that I propose as the starting point
for your deliberation on how to root the state in the South
Sudan in grassroots communities at one end and project it
into the global sphere at the other end. The specifics need
to be worked out by you who are better acquainted with the
reality prevailing in your society and region of Africa
We should hence reject that the choice is between either
the modern or the traditional. Instead we should tap into
and employ the positive and applicable aspects of both. State
institutions should hence reflect the positive aspects of
both the traditional and the modern. How can the House of
Nationalities serve such a role? It can serve as the repository
of traditional practices and know-how. What possible roles
can it have? It can, for example, serve as an additional channel
of communication between the central state institutions and
grassroots communities. It can also serve as an additional
venue of deliberation on issues involving relations between
nationalities. The modern sector may reflect participation
in political life on individual basis while the House of Nationalities
may serve the purpose of giving voice to traditional groups.
All of this requires an intricate balancing act which can
only be polished by conducting routine assessments in order
to fine tune structures and practices. If you succeed in this
enterprise you will make an important contribution to Africa.
And I wish you success.
References
Davidson, Basil (1992). The Black Man’s Burden: Africa
and the Curse of the Nation-State. London: James Currey.
Legesse, Asmarom (2000). Oromo Democracy: An Indigenous African
Political System. Lawrenceville, NJ: Red Sea Press.
O’Leary, Damian (1999). “Cultural Identity and
Constitutional Reform: The Challenge of Northern Ireland.”
In P. J. Hanafin and M. S. Williams (eds.), Identity, Rights
and Constitutional Transformation. Aldershot: Ashgate, pp.
89-110.
Suliman, Mohammed (1999). “Conflict Resolution among
the Borana and the Fur: Similar Features and Different Outcomes.”
In Mohammed Suliman (ed.), Ecology, Politics and Violent Conflict.
London: Zed Books, pp. 289-90.
