1. Introduction:

The primary function of any government is the protection of life and property for its citizens and the settlement of conflicts among them. For the Sudan such government came into being only during the colonial era (1898-1916). Prior to that period, the Sudan did not have a central authority that cared for the protection of communal life and property. Even the Turko-Egyptian rule which established a central authority for the first time (1820) was busy collecting revenue and recruiting men for its army rather than concerning itself with the task of a responsible government. Following the colonial era, on the other hand, central governments have become more concerned with building power bases within local communities rather than with settling disputes among them.

Sudan 's communities have, therefore, been concerned about their own peace. They have developed their own mechanisms for conflict prevention, management and resolution (CPMR).

Mediation, known in the Sudan as " Judiyya", has emerged as the principal mechanism for CPMR. For mediation to function successfully individuals must display certain attitude and behaviour patterns.

All these social values are passed on from one generation to the other. The family is the primarily institution that socializes individuals to adhere to social values. Sudanese communities have been preserving such values by embodying them in their standard proverbs and sayings (Examples).

2. Judiyya:

A mediation mechanism is even more developed in southern Sudan. Among the Dinka and Nuer, the most numerous and most embattled tribes in the Southern Sudan the following institutions could be identified as mechanisms for CPMR:

In Northern Sudan, an individual (e.g. Feki) or a wise man or a group of people accepted by the community as Ajawid could carry out mediation. The Ajawid are mostly tribal elders, who are versed in the communal customs and traditions not party in conflict and are known for their impartiality and peace loving.

Conflicts occur at different societal levels (within the family, between clans or among bigger identity groups); the magnitude also differs from one incident to the other. Homicide is an incident that leads to the largest warfare if not controlled. In any case, medication starts either as requested by the parties in conflict of, mostly, by a voluntary intervention of the Ajawid. The sanctity accrued to Judiyya allows the Ajawid to successfully resolve conflicts, most of the time.

Typically, a Judiyya gathering results in deciding compensation, for losses resulting from conflict. Blood money is essential for pre-empting retaliation and vengeance. Bilateral agreements among identity groups may sometimes lead to nominal or no compensations payment. In the past compensation were generally paid in cattle. Today they have become monetary.

In a typical Judiyya meeting (i.e. conference) the ultimate aim of the Ajawid is to reach amicable agreements so that brotherly relation –ships are restored among parties in conflict. To do this, the Ajawid divide themselves in (doves) and (hawks). The former would resort mostly to symbolism, addressing passions. The latter put pressure on the party resisting settlements so that they may have a will for settlement. Numerous sayings and proverbs are usually cited by both the (doves) and (hawks). (An example from Humr " tribe of western Kordofan state of how imminent tribal warfare might be pre-empted).

Symbolism plays the most important role in making parties in conflict want to have a settlement for their dispute. Example from:

A . The Dinka Nuer Wunlit agreement.

B. The Rezaigat – Zaghawa conflict (1987).

3. Judiyya During the colonial era

Maintaining law and order is imperative for effective colonization (for the extraction of resources). The colonial government in the Sudan, therefore was quick in establishing the law enforcement institutions in rural Sudan:

Side by side with these institutions, however, the colonial government also founded "the native court" that applied customary laws. It also allowed customary medications to operate independent of state and native courts.

To further assure communal pacification, the colonial administration founded the system of "native administration". Native administrators are principally entrusted with maintaining law and order both within their identity groups and with other groups. Prior to the adoption of native administration, kinship leaders were warriors, leading raids against other identity groups. The colonial government changed their role to peace building. It also recognized native administrators as the principal Ajawid in government –sponsored conferences.

Such conferences were usually held when bigger identity groups resorted to violence and respective native administrators were unable or unwilling to resolve conflicts. These, however, were rare occasions. For instance, for the entire colonial period in Darfur (1916_1956) only one conference was held to settle disputes among northern kordofan camel nomads ( i.e. the Kababish ) on the one hand, and their counterpart in Northern Darfur province ( the Zayyadiyya , the Midob and the Bertty ) on the other. This is known as Umgozain conference (1932 ). Following the colonial era, however, four peace making conferences have been held for the same parties in conflict (1957, 1982, 1996, 1998)

4. How Government –Sponsored mediation operates:

The conference starts with listening to petitions made by the disputants. A lengthy negotiation is then carried out by the Ajawid before an agreement is reached and signed by the representatives for parties in conflict. In the past Native Administrators were the ones responsible for implementing what had been agreed upon, including compensation and regulation of land uses.

5. How Government intervention weakened customary Mediation?

National governments in general have been interfering with tribal structures, processes and values. The result has been negative as far as customary mediation is concerned. Leftists revolutionary governments (1964,1969,1985) undermined the position of native administrators who were:

1st- peace keepers

2nd- Principal Ajawid in peace making conferences.

Following the October popular uprising (1964) a resolution was passed for the liquidation of native administration. It had not been implemented though because the government was short-lived. Then the second revolutionary government, which came to power in 1969, actually dissolved native administration in 1970, unseating the paramount chiefs. Although middle and lower ranks were retained, the damage had been done and ever since native administrators have never become enthusiastic about their traditional functions. This was the period when lawlessness prevailed in rural Sudan, especially in western Sudan.

Revolutionary as well as conservative political parties have negatively influenced the tribal system. The principal political parties (the Umma and the NUP) are not known for being hostile to native administration or customary mediation. However, they have been accused of taking sides in tribal conflicts, to the extent of supplying one party or another with firearms, an accusation that the two parties strongly deny.

The radical change for native administration and Judiyya system, however, he has come with the present government, which came to power in1989. From its very inception, it made it clear that it aimed at radical social transformation for the entire Sudanese communities. They are to be streamlined with the declared policy of the new government. The present government affected customary mediation in several ways:

ü It removed from office undesirable native administrators and replaced them with political faithfuls. Thus political loyalty superseded administrative efficiency. Newly appointed Native Administrators are not necessarily peacekeepers.

ü The Ajawid, therefore, lost their impartiality, which is a prerequisite for successful mediation.

ü The government has its political priorities sometimes conflicting with the interests of parties in conflict. For instance, in the Arab-Massalit reconciliation conference, the government denied the Ajawid the right to dig deeper into the root causes of the conflict (e.g. partitioning the Massalit Sultanate into Emirates).

6. Any Future for the customary mediation:

In most parts of rural Sudan, disputes are still resolved through customary mediation. Even migrants to urban centres prefer to take their disputes to customary mediators, rather than to the police station or modern state law courts. Some native courts presidents prefer popular disputes be resolved through customary mediation than through their courts decisions. Azzain Hussein Zakki ed Deen, the Bedariyya emir in Al Obied, is one of such court presidents. In an interview with him, he justified his position by saying: " the court declares one of the disputants victorious and the other the loser. Bad feelings remain in their hearts and be responsible for future conflicts. The Judiyya, on the other hand, resolves the conflict. In a typical Judiyya none of the parties considers itself to be the winner or the loser. The Judiyya reaches amicable agreements. The likelihood of future conflicts will, therefore, be minimized".

On the other hand, the Feki, or holy man, will also continue to play an important role in resolving conflicts at the grass roots level, particularly among Muslims who will generally tend to abide by what the Shariaa says with regard to issues of contention. The Feki helps disputants to see what the Shariaa says.

The government sponsored reconciliation conferences, however, face the real challenge. They have increasingly become ineffective in putting ends to inter-communal conflicts. Darfur region of Western Sudan is presently the most riddled with inter-communal violent conflicts. Repeated conferences have been unsuccessful in ending the conflicts. For instance, during the period 1957-1997 (40 years), one investigator found that 30 conferences were held to unsuccessfully resolve conflicts. Many of them were repeated conferences for the same parties. Several factors account for this:

ü Firstly, native administrators, who are key Ajawid in conferences, no longer wield power among their tribal followers. Instead, it is the tribal militia leaders who decide to go to war or make peace with their tribal adversaries.

ü Secondly; increasingly the Ajawid have been losing their independence and impartiality. They are being paid by the government to do the job. As the government has been increasingly accused as taking sides, the Ajawid that the government appoints to mediate, are also perceived as not neutral. Their decisions are, therefore, not duely respected.

ü Thirdly, in most cases the central government will have its own political agenda, which it wants to pass through the conference. In other wards, it tends to use the conference as a political platform for building political support, rather that resolving the issue at hand.

ü Finally, the government interference may put an end to a deeply rooted practice in the Judiyya- looking into the root-causes of the problem. Instead, the Ajawid could be directed by the government to deal with the episodic factors leading to conflict, rather than going deep into the root causes. In the famous Massaleet-Arab peace making conference, the Ajawid were reportedly directed not to discuss the state governor's decision of dividing up the Massaleet Sultanate into smaller emirates. In the eyes of the Ajawid, and indeed the parties in conflict, it is the governor decision, which led to the bloody violence between parties in conflict. Eventually, government –sponsored mediations tend to be mechanisms for conflict "postponement" rather that resolution.